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Summary
Ensuring the protection of privacy and the compliance with
data protection rules have become central issues for re-
searchers active in the biomedical field. Data protection
law is often perceived as very complex and difficult to in-
terpret, which can hinder the efficacious planning and im-
plementation of new research projects. Indeed, the so-
phisticated legal architecture that governs data processing
activities in general and biomedical research in particular
might feel overwhelming for both legal practitioners and
researchers.
The objective of this article is to review the interaction of
data protection law and biomedical research with a pre-
dominant focus on the Swiss context. In order to facili-
tate a better understanding of this issue, we discuss three
crucial nodes that shape the interplay of law and data
processing in research First, we explore the meaning of
“personal” data, the requirements to classify data as “per-
sonal”, “non-personal”, “pseudonymised” or “anonymised”
and the implications of such classifications from a legal
perspective. We then consider the relationship between
sector-specific data processing regulations for research
and other laws on data protection. Finally, we examine the
role of consent for data processing in the research field
and its significance from a data protection perspective. In
conclusion, this review underlines the importance of fos-
tering reciprocal collaboration of data protection experts
and biomedical researchers to facilitate the development
of new projects in the future.
Keywords: biomedical research, data protection, person-
al data, bioethics, consent
Introduction
In the last few years, concerns about the protection of per-
sonal data have become an increasingly important subject
of discussion in biomedical research. Although it could be
argued that data in general, and personal data in particular,
have always been a central component of research, it is on-
ly recently that discussions about the appropriate data pro-
cessing standards in this field have intensified. Arguably,
this could be due to two intertwined factors, one related to
the research world and one to legal developments. On the
one hand, due to the progressive digitalisation of health-
care, clinics, laboratories and other medical research insti-
tutions have become data-driven environments, where the
processing of large amounts data has grown exponentially.
Fuelled by innovative projects in fields like genomics (e.g.,
the human genome project [1]), neuroscience (e.g., the hu-
man brain project [2]) and by the development of preci-
sion medicine [3], the urge to accumulate vast amounts of
personal data of different types has skyrocketed. This has
been further intensified by the open science and open da-
ta movements in their different forms [4]. On the other
hand, the law is taking an active interest in the regulation
of data processing across all industries and particularly for
research purposes. In the recent General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR) [5] by the European Union, for ex-
ample, it is reasserted that research undoubtedly falls un-
der the scope of data protection law and the law creates
a specific “research exemption” for the processing of data
for research purposes, especially in case of secondary pro-
cessing [6] (see also the section “The relevance of consent
for data processing in research”). In preamble1 159, it is
firmly asserted that: “Where personal data are processed
for scientific research purposes, this Regulation should al-
so apply […]. For the purposes of this Regulation, the pro-
cessing of personal data for scientific research purposes
should be interpreted in a broad manner including for ex-
ample technological development and demonstration, fun-
damental research, applied research and privately funded
research.”
The increasing importance of considering data protection
aspects in biomedical research also holds true for Switzer-
land, where several projects have been put in place to
facilitate the legal and ethical use of data for research.
For example, fostering more comprehensive, coordinated
and efficient processing of data in healthcare was one of
the main objectives of the National Research Program 74
launched in 2015 by the Swiss National Science Founda-
tion [7]. In the same spirit, the Swiss Personalised Health
Network (SPHN) was recently started as a nationwide ini-
tiative with the specific mandate to leverage the potential
of health-related data [8] with respect to the research sector
[9]. Or else, in 2016, the Swiss Biobanking Platform was
initiated to facilitate the harmonisation of biobanks and
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their research work with biological material and personal
data [10]. All these initiatives are designed with particular
attention paid to the legal ramifications of data protection,
especially in reference to Switzerland’s specific legislation
for processing personal data in the research sector (the Hu-
man Research Act - HRA [11], see below). Issues related
to the legal ramifications of data protection in relation to
scientific research are also likely to remain a central con-
cern for the scientific community in the future, since a re-
vised version of the Federal Act on Data Protection (FADP
[12]) is currently being discussed [13] (for the relationship
between FADP and HRA, see below).
Within this context of biomedical research and data pro-
tection law, the latter is often perceived as a potential hin-
drance from the perspective of researchers. In internation-
al reports on the status quo of the health-data framework
of Switzerland and other developed countries, it is often
referenced to as “legal barriers” (e.g., [14]). Indeed, even
in interviews with national stakeholders conducted for our
ongoing research on the health-data framework in Switzer-
land2 [15], a common complaint from researchers was that
navigating data protection rules is demanding. Prima facie,
such observation appears to have some factual basis. In
Switzerland alone there are 26 different data protection
regulations (the FADP and 25 cantonal data protection
laws – the cantons of Jura and Neuchatel have a common
data protection bill [16]), a law on biomedical research,
several other sectorial regulations containing norms about
personal data processing, and even additional rules related
to data processing in the criminal code (see below). It
is understandable that researchers in the biomedical field
might feel overwhelmed by such a complex regulatory ar-
chitecture. In fact, even for legal experts, the coordination
of data protection rules and research poses many uncer-
tainties [17]. In this respect, addressing difficulties con-
cerning how to combine the potential of data-rich research
projects with adequate privacy protections for participants
(data subjects) necessitate open dialogue between the re-
search and the legal fields.
The objective of this article is to offer an overview of the
current debate in the legal field around three nodes of da-
ta protection law that concern biomedical research. It pro-
vides a critical review, according to the classification by
Grant and Booth [18], since it aims to go beyond mere de-
scription of the reviewed literature and case law and in-
cludes a certain degree of conceptual innovation. Given
space constraints, our focus is on three nodes that are con-
sidered of primary importance in the literature. Other rel-
evant issues in the legal debate (e.g., the concepts of pur-
pose limitation or data minimisation) are only indirectly
addressed insofar as it is relevant to the other topics of the
review. We start by tackling the meaning of personal data,
since this is the primary criterion that determines whether
any data protection rules apply – including in biomedical
research. Then, we discuss specific data-protection rules
concerning the processing of personal data for research
purposes. Finally, we turn to the topic of consent and clar-
ify its role in data processing in general and data process-
ing for research in particular. This review draws mainly on
legal literature and legal sources (both judicial decisions
and legal texts), but our intent is to address the medical
and research community. Moreover, although the focus is
on Switzerland and its legal framework, this review is al-
so of interest for a non-Swiss readership, since the three
nodes under discussion are central to the relationship be-
tween data protection and research across borders. To help
link the content of this review with the legal texts, we pro-
vide a conversion table (table 1) of the legal terminology
discussed, to facilitate reference to original legislative acts
not written in English.
Three “nodes” at the crossroad between bio-
medical research and data protection law
The meaning of personal data
Data protection law is not relevant for the processing of
data in general, but rather it is specifically applied to the
processing of personal data. This is a common trait of
virtually every piece of legislation on data protection. In
Switzerland, for example, this is clearly established by the
FADP (art. 3.a [12]), the HRA (art. 2 para. 1.e [11]) and
most of the cantonal data protection regulations3. For the
field of biomedical research, this implies that data protec-
tion rules apply only if researchers are using personal data.
Biomedical research with non-personal (or anonymised,
see below) data falls outside the scope of data protection
rules (for more details, see [19] p. 109) and thus does not
require, amongst other things, approval from ethics com-
mittees. The staggering difference in the regulatory regime
between personal and non-personal data, clearly begs the
question of how to distinguish between these two cate-
gories.
In the legal literature, the exact meaning of what consti-
tutes personal data is extensively debated and the exact
borders of this category are highly contested [17], espe-
cially after recent developments in the field of data science
[20]. In regulations, personal data are usually defined as
information relating to an identified or identifiable person.
For example, the FADP states that personal data are “all
information relating to an identified or identifiable person”
(art 3.a [12]). Virtually every other cantonal data protection
law contains a similar definition and even for the EU level,
the GDPR (art. 4 (1) [5]) uses very similar words, although
Table 1: Cross-language comparison for Switzerland of the legal terminology discussed as part of the first node.
Term in English discussed in this re-
view
Corresponding term in German Corresponding term in French Corresponding term in Italian
“Personal data” “Personendaten” or “Personenbezogene
Daten”
“Données personnelles” “Dati personali”
“Relating to” “sich beziehen auf”* “se rapporter a”† “relative a”‡
“Identified or identifiable” “Bestimmt oder bestimmbar” “identifiée ou identifiable” “identificata o identificabile”
* As in article 3.a. of the FADP “Personendaten (Daten): alle Angaben, die sich auf eine bestimmte oder bestimmbare Person beziehen”. † As in article 3.a. of the FADP “données
personnelles (données), toutes les informations qui se rapportent à une personne identifiée ou identifiable” ‡ As in article 3.a. of the FADP “dati personali (dati): tutte le infor-
mazioni relative a una persona identificata o identificabile”
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it refers only to natural persons. Along the same line, the
HRA defines (health related) personal data as “informa-
tion concerning the health or disease of a specific or iden-
tifiable person” (art. 3.f [11]). All these definitions are rel-
atively open-ended and leave room for interpretation by
legal doctrine and by courts. In practice, to understand
within a specific biomedical research project whether the
data being processed are personal, two4 elements are of
primary importance. First, it must be determined whether
data are relating to a person. Secondly, it must be deter-
mined whether this person is identified or identifiable. If
both conditions are satisfied, data must be considered per-
sonal and data protection rules will apply.
In the context of biomedical research, it will often be clear
that data relate to a person, since most of the data used are
about people. However, in order to be personal, data must
not only be relating to a person, but the person must also be
identified or identifiable. With respect to this requirement,
it is difficult from a legal point of view to give clear-cut
answers. Cases where the data relate to an identified per-
son, i.e., when the identity of the person is evident from
the data ([22] p. 34), are easy to recognise. If, for example,
the database of a research project contains the names or
the addresses of the people whose data are processed, such
data will obviously relate to an identified person and thus
be personal data ([19], p. 516). Cases where data relate to
an identifiable person, i.e., when the identity of the person
does not emerge directly from the data(set) itself but can
be derived from the context or the combination with other
data, are more difficult ([22] p. 34). Whether such data can
still be considered personal data depends on several fac-
tors, since the legal concept of identifiability – at least in
Switzerland – is relative and not absolute ([22] p. 34). Tra-
ditionally, legal doctrine has argued that both an objective
(the existence of means to re-identify) and a subjective fac-
tor (a sufficient interest by the data-processor to re-iden-
tify) need to be present in order for data to be considered
identifiable [23]. The relativity of the concept of identifia-
bility and its dependency on context and intentions of the
data-processors are also confirmed by case law. In a recent
decision of the Swiss Federal Supreme Court [24], for ex-
ample, the judges ruled that images of people on Google
Street View are identifiable (and thus personal data) since
the identity of the person can often be derived by the con-
text (e.g. dress, location, etc.), notably this applies even if
faces are blurred. In another decision by the same court
[25], it was established that IP-addresses are data relating
to an identifiable person, if the data-processor in the spe-
cific case has the concrete possibility to access additional
information that can lead to (re-)identification of the per-
son using the IP-address. Therefore, the relative nature of
the concept of identifiability entails that even the same data
that might be considered non-personal in a certain context
may be deemed personal if the circumstances change.
In the biomedical research context, anonymisation repre-
sents the procedure through which data cease to be iden-
tifiable and thus personal. Indeed, rather than speaking of
non-personal data, the term anonymised data is often heard
in this context. From a legal perspective, anonymisation is
defined as the procedure through which personal data are
processed so that re-identifying the person becomes either
impossible or disproportionately difficult ([19] p. 512). Ar-
ticle 25 of the Human Research Ordinance (HRO [26])
explains that “for the anonymisation of […] health-relat-
ed personal data, all items which, when combined, would
enable the data subject to be identified without dispro-
portionate effort, must be irreversibly masked or deleted.
In particular, the name, address, date of birth and unique
identification numbers must be masked or deleted.” Since
the law provides a non-exhaustive list of elements that
must be deleted in order to anonymise personal data, this
leaves some room for interpreting what actual processes
can be considered relevant to match the legal definition of
anonymisation. Due to current advances in big data analyt-
ics, there are concerns that the legal concept of anonymi-
sation is bound to become ever more elusive ([22] p. 34),
but in current practice anonymisation can be treated as the
flipside of identifiability (see previous paragraph). In order
to determine whether data are truly anonymised (and thus
non-personal), both the material chances of re-identifica-
tion and the interest in re-identifying must be evaluated on
a case-by-case fashion ([19] p. 513). This means, in turn,
that the problems of relativity described above with re-
spect to identifiability also apply to anonymisation. There-
fore, the classification of a certain dataset as anonymised
might not be definitive: if the circumstances change and
the links to identities of individuals are re-established ([19]
pp. 515ss), this would turn anonymised data back into be-
ing classifiable as personal. This generates more legal un-
certainty when compared to the legal situation in the US,
where health data are considered definitively de-identified
(i.e., anonymised) once a precise and exhaustive list of 18
personal identifiers are removed [27]. The porous differ-
entiation between personal data and anonymised data in
Switzerland also implies that even for research projects
processing data that they deem anonymised, it could still
be convenient to adhere to the rules of personal data pro-
cessing (e.g., in terms of data security).
Pseudonymisation or coding are also often described as
procedures through which data can somehow be made
“less” personal. From a legal point of view, coding (and
equally pseudonymising) is regarded as the process
through which the elements that link data to the identity of
a person are reversibly removed ([19] p. 512). For exam-
ple, if a research project aims at studying mortality rates
after one type of surgery based on retrospective analysis
of routinely collected data from two different hospitals, re-
searchers might merge data from the two hospitals in a uni-
fied database, remove the original case-IDs of each single
patient and substitute them with newly developed code-
names. If it is possible to reverse such process and go back
from the codenames to the original case-IDs of the two
hospital, these data might be considered as pseudonymised
from a legal point of view. In contrast to anonymising,
which irreversibly prevents data from being connected to
an identifiable person and thus renders the data non-per-
sonal, coding/pseudonymising simply represents a way to
better protect personal data and to benefit, under certain
circumstances, from better conditions concerning the reuse
of data for research purposes (see also last section). To re-
fer back to the terminology of the previous sections, if data
are simply coded or pseudonymised, they will still be re-
lating to an identifiable person (and thus still be person-
al data), although only indirectly by means of a key.5 If,
on the contrary, data are anonymised, the key to link them
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back to an identifiable person either does not exist or it has
been eliminated. The exact boundary between these two
categories can often be blurry, especially when the key ex-
ists, but it is not directly and easily accessible to the re-
searchers and it is not their intent to re-identify patients.6
Moreover, it has been argued that, aside from the legal re-
quirements, the actual practices for producing anonymisa-
tion are far from uniform in Switzerland [29].
To help researchers navigate these different aspects, we
summarised this section in a decision-tree (fig. 1.) that can
be used to reflect whether data used in a research project
are indicatively personal or non-personal.
Sector-specific data protection rules for research
If they ascertain that the data in their project are personal
and thus data protection rules apply, researchers still need
to determine which specific regulatory framework they
need to follow. Traditionally in Europe, data protection
rules are contained in legislative acts that regulate the pro-
cessing of personal data across sectors. In Switzerland, for
example, the FADP contains general rules on the process-
ing of personal data by federal bodies (e.g. federal uni-
versities) and private persons (e.g. pharmaceutical com-
panies), while cantonal data protection regulations set the
norms for the processing of data relating to or deriving
from cantonal bodies (e.g. cantonal hospitals and cantonal
universities). On top of these general regulations, a number
of additional data protection rules are scattered across sev-
eral sectorial legislative acts (fig. 2). The principal ones in
the field of interest for this article are the HRA [11], the
law on electronic patient record (LEPR [30]), the Law on
Health insurance (LHI [31]), the Epidemic Law (EL [32]),
the Law on Cancer Registration (LCR [33]), the Federal
Statistic Act (FSA [34]) and the Federal Act on Human
Genetic Testing (HGTA [35]). The HRA covers the collec-
tion and analysis of data in the field of human research.
The LEPR concerns the “processing of data in the electron-
ic patient record” (art. 1 [30]), which hospitals and nurs-
ing homes have the duty to offer [36]. The LHI contains
some data protection rules concerning duties of healthcare
providers and healthcare payees to transfer data to federal
offices with monitoring (art. 23 and art 59a [31]) or quality
control purposes (art 58b and 58c [31]). The EL has some
sectorial rules applicable to “process personal data, includ-
ing data concerning health, for the purpose of identifying
people who are ill, potentially ill, infected, potentially in-
fected or that expel pathogen elements with respect to pub-
lic health provisions, in particular to single out and surveil
contagious illness and fight against them” (art. 58 [32]).
The LCR regulates the “collection, recording and analysis
of data concerning cancer illnesses” (Art. 1 [33]) for mon-
itoring, prevention, quality development and research pur-
poses (art. 2 [33]). The FSA delineates some data protec-
tion rules for the processing of data by the Federal Office
of Statistics. The HGTA focuses on the regulation of genet-
ic testing for the medical, employment, insurance and lia-
bility contexts and it contains some rules on the protection
of genetic data. Lastly, the processing of data by healthcare
professionals and researchers is also covered by the rules
on confidentiality in the Criminal Code (art. 321 and art.
321bis Criminal Code [37]).
For researchers, this framework of data protection rules in-
volving several legislative acts might look quite difficult
to navigate. Indeed, even from a legal point of view, de-
termining exactly which rules concerning data protection
have to be followed in a single research project can be a
challenge. There are, however, some general indications
that can be given. One general principle of law is that lex
specialis derogat legi generali, i.e., when two pieces of
law cover the same subject matter the specific legislation
derogates the more general one. In the case of data protec-
tion rules, the more general legislations are the FADP and
the other cantonal data protection acts, since they regulate
the processing of data across sectors. This means that their
framework can be derogated if a specific legislation cover-
ing the processing of personal data in particular sector ex-
ists. This is the case for the field of biomedical research,
where the passing of the HRA in 2011 created sector-spe-
Figure 1: Ascertaining whether the data in a research-project are personal or not. A supportive decision-tree. This decision-tree has merely in-
dicative and instructive (rather than prescriptive) purposes, since every schematisation involves some degree of simplification and approxima-
tion. Specificities of each single case (such as linking possibilities) might lead to different outcomes.
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cific data protection rules that apply to the processing of
personal data for biomedical research. As noted, the HRA
created a proper “data protection regime” for the field of
biomedical research ([19] p. 808). Data protection rules
contained in the FADP and other general cantonal data pro-
tection regulations have thus a subsidiary function, i.e.,
they can be considered to supplement the rules of the HRA.
In other words, the general data protection regulations re-
main applicable in cases where the provisions of the HRA
are not exhaustive enough (see also [19] pp. 809ss).
The presence of a sector-specific regulation containing da-
ta protection rules for the field of biomedical research has
both advantages and disadvantages. A considerable advan-
tage is that the processing of data for biomedical research
purposes has its own peculiar needs and features – for ex-
ample, compared to data processing for marketing purpos-
es, or for other types of research. In this respect, having
data protection rules tailored to the field of biomedical re-
search (rather than the more general rules contained in the
FADP [12]) was perceived as particularly important by the
regulator [38]. Another advantage is that the presence of a
specific regulation for the field of research does, to some
extent, allow for the harmonisation of rules throughout a
country [39]. Other European countries, such as Germany,
do not have a general regulation that comprehensively cov-
ers biomedical research [40], and data protection rules for
this sector are scattered amongst several other laws [41].
Having a sector-specific regulation, however, also entails
disadvantages. These include factors such as the coordina-
tion and the interplay with other existing regulations con-
taining rules on data processing. We will turn to these two
issues consecutively.
To determine whether a research project can benefit from
the sector-specific data protection rules of the HRA, it
must be determined if the project falls within the scope of
this act. Art. 2 para. 1 [11] defines the scope of the HRA
and states that the act “applies to research concerning hu-
man diseases and concerning the structure and function of
the human body”. As it has been clarified ([19] p. 103),
the scope of application of the HRA is based on the aim,
and not directly on the type/design of the research, which
is in contrast to an earlier draft of the HRA [42]. The scope
of the HRA is thus quite broad: as long as a methodolo-
gy recognised by the scientific community is used to pro-
duce knowledge with the (distant?) objective of improv-
ing medical standards or better understanding the human
body (and its subparts), the HRA will apply [19, 38]. For
the HRA to apply, another important fact to consider is
whether the project is using health related personal data.
Although a very general definition of this concept is pro-
vided in art. 3.f [11] of the HRA, the exact meaning of
health related personal data is bound to be influenced by
technological advances and by the context in which data
are processed [43]. No relevant rulings by Swiss Feder-
al courts are present to help guide practice. Legal doctrine
in Switzerland traditionally interprets the concept of health
data very broadly, including all personal data that have a
direct or indirect connection with the physical or psycho-
logical health of a person ([22] p. 39; [44] p. 56). More-
over, as recently highlighted [43], it is increasingly diffi-
cult to distinguish from “traditional” health data and new
forms of data (especially those collected digitally) that can
be used to infer knowledge about the health status of a per-
son. Since health data are universally considered as partic-
ularly sensitive7, the blurred edges of their definition are
particularly problematic. In fact, determining whether or
not the personal data being processed is health-related, not
only determines the applicability of the HRA, but triggers
specific (and usually more stringent) requirements for da-
ta processing. This is because health data – together with
other types of data, such as those about religion or political
orientation – are considered particularly sensitive and thus
deserving special protection (on the notion of particular-
ly sensitive data, see e.g., [22] pp. 37ss). For example, the
FADP (Art. 4 para 5) stipulates that when personal data are
processed based on consent, that consent must be explic-
it when particularly sensitive data such as health data are
processed.
Figure 2: An overview of parts of the legislative framework concerning data processing in Switzerland. The image does not aim to be exhaus-
tive, but merely indicative of the relationship between different legislative acts concerning data protection and data processing in the health-
care sector.
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However, even if the scope of sector-specific regulation
like the HRA is clarified, some additional questions might
emerge for researchers. What happens with “borderline”
research projects, which may rely on innovative method-
ologies (e.g. mining of electronic health records), or make
use of large datasets generated during clinical routine and
are not aimed at singling out individual cases (e.g. retro-
spective registry-based studies)? What if a research pro-
ject processes data from multiple sources and which were
originally collected according to different data-protection
regimes (e.g. combining data from insurance providers,
cantonal hospitals and the Federal Office of Statistics)?
How do the data processing rules of these different regimes
interact? Unfortunately, such questions do not have one-
size-fits-all answers from a legal perspective. Innovative
healthcare service research that relies on data routinely col-
lected is relatively underdeveloped in Switzerland ([45] p.
28) and has only been recently encouraged by the scientific
community (e.g. through the aforementioned NRP 74 [7]).
How to combine existing rules on data protection and data
processing with this type of research will require the effort
of both the research and the legal field to develop efficient
and accepted practices. The latter should help, for exam-
ple, to simplify the combination of different sectorial legal
regimes and of the federal and cantonal data protection law
(see e.g., [46], and, to better clarify the distinction between
processing of data for research and for quality improve-
ment purposes, see [47, 48]). Moreover, a balance should
be found between easing the requirements for the process-
ing of data for research (through the creation of a “research
exemption” [6]) and the retention of ethical requirements,
especially with respect to health data [49]. Lastly, particu-
lar attention should be given to the topic of consent, which
we address in the next section.
The relevance of consent for data processing in re-
search
Consent, especially in the field of biomedical research, has
considerable importance, since it has traditionally been one
of the key requirements to legitimately enrol patients in
clinical studies and it is one of the cornerstones of research
ethics. This is due to the fact that consent has become a
fundamental precondition to justify the intrusion upon the
physical integrity of both patients and research participants
[50]. When data processing techniques evolved so that
more research could be undertaken without any physical
contact with participants, but rather through the processing
of their data, consent continued to remain a pivotal require-
ment, especially because of its ethical significance. Par-
ticipants’ protection rules like the requirement of consent
were upheld, in the conviction that data processing for re-
search entails an intangible (rather than physical) invasion
of personal integrity [51]. Consent, thus, remained one of
the central paradigms of data processing for research pur-
poses to such an extent that, even when processing happens
without traditional informed consent, it is often spoken of
presumed consent solutions (e.g., for the collection of da-
ta in registries and the performance of epidemiological re-
search with them in Denmark [52] and [53]).
From the legal perspective, however, the role of consent
for data processing is quite different. While consent re-
mains a fundamental instrument to protect informational
self-determination8 especially when it comes to health data
(e.g., [56].), the concept may come into play at different
levels. Where the law, such as the GDPR at the EU-level,
requires a lawful basis for any data processing, the long list
of grounds that permit data processing includes not only
consent, but also several alternatives, such as the necessity
to perform a contract, the pursuance of a legal obligation
or the protection of a vital interest of a natural person (art.
6 GDPR [5]).
In Switzerland, one has to distinguish whether personal da-
ta are being processed by a federal or cantonal body or by
private persons. If personal data are processed by private
entities, the FADP [12] does not necessarily require con-
sent to be obtained. If processing does not comply with
general data protection principles, which could lead to a
potential violation of the data subject’s personality rights,
it may be possible to justify such processing by several
means: by obtaining consent ([21] p. 350; [22] p. 165) a
specific legislative act authorising such data processing, or
by the presence of an overriding private (e.g., the execu-
tion of a contract) or public interest (e.g., the compilation
of statistics) - Art. 13 FADP ([12]; [22] p. 172). If personal
data are processed by federal public bodies, a formal leg-
islative act authorising the processing is necessary to use
personal data, consent of the person being of minor rel-
evance ([22] pp. 220ss). In both contexts (processing by
private persons or by federal public bodies), data process-
ing for research, planning and statistics is privileged (art.
13 sec. 2 lit. e and art. 22 FADP) by the presence of less
rigid conditions ([22] pp. 184ss and 290ss; [44] pp. 124ss),
which partly resemble the “research exemption” present at
the EU level [6]. These considerations show that, from a
legal perspective, the right question researchers should for-
mulate when they design the data protection framework of
a project is not “Do we have consent?”, but rather “Do we
need consent?”.
To better understand what this means in practice, it is help-
ful to consider a case study offered by the rules of the
HRA. As specified in the previous section, the HRA rep-
resents a sector-specific set of data processing rules for
biomedical research. In articles 32-35 [11], this act sets
some specific conditions for the “further processing” (or
secondary processing) of personal data. Further processing
refers to those cases where data are collected for a specific
aim (e.g. during the provision of care) but can then poten-
tially be re-used for research purposes. A classic example
is the further processing for research purposes of routinely
collected data from hospitals, which has received much at-
tention and prompted both application (e.g., [57].) and im-
plementation (e.g., [58]) projects. In such cases, the HRA
offers multiple requirements and possibilities for further
data processing (for more details see e.g., [59]). For genet-
ic data and for non-genetic health data in an identified form
(i.e. non-coded/non-pseudonymised), the requirement for
further data processing is having the consent of the data-
subject, in some cases even of a “general” nature (art. 32.1,
32.2 and 33.1 HRA ([11]; [19] p. 484). For the further pro-
cessing of non-genetic health data in a coded form or for
the anonymisation of genetic data, the requirement is for
the provision of information and the acknowledgment of
the right to dissent (but explicit consent is not necessary
[19] p. 499). However, when provision of consent (first
case) or provision of information (second case) is not pos-
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sible, an alternative strategy for undertaking further data
processing is to receive an exceptional exemption by the
competent Research Ethics Committee (Art. 34 HRA [11];
see also [19] pp. 501ss). The latter needs to ascertain that:
(1) providing consent (first case) or information (second
case) is impossible or disproportionately difficult; (2) no
documented refusal by the subject whose data are used is
available; and (3) the interests of the research project out-
weigh the interests of the person concerned (art. 34 HRA
[11]). Since this contingency is defined in theory as excep-
tional, it is disputed whether the application of this alterna-
tive route for (further) data processing should be regularly
used [19, 60]. In any case, this example shows how, from a
purely legal perspective, consent often remains a very rel-
evant aspect of lawful data processing, but it is not neces-
sarily the only one. Other alternative requirements for da-
ta processing is a matter for the law to settle. How (and
how often) they are used within the legal limitations, is a
matter for practice to develop. In this context, it should al-
so be kept in mind that, as mentioned above, data protec-
tion rules contained in more general regulations (such as
the FADP for Switzerland) may continue to apply in a sub-
sidiary function.
Conclusion
In this article, we explored three intersections of data pro-
tection law and biomedical research. We first focused on
the concept of personal data, which represents the most im-
portant criterion to determine whether data protection rules
apply at all. We then analysed the sector-specific data pro-
tection rules for research and their interaction with more
general data protection norms. Finally, we reflected on the
topic of consent for data processing from a legal perspec-
tive. Our aim was to help bridge the gap between the le-
gal and biomedical sectors by providing an overview of
the legal debate regarding several important elements of
data processing relevant for the biomedical sector. Given
the complexity of such elements, we explained why there
cannot be an expectation to find the exact and exhaustive
rules for correct data processing in one single document,
be it a legislative act, a guideline or a policy statement.
This is also due to the fact that data protection and priva-
cy are important values, but they are not absolute and, es-
pecially with respect to research, have to be balanced with
other important legal and ethical principles. Therefore, the
establishment of such balance will require collaboration
between biomedical research professionals and legal ex-
perts. This cooperative effort will be crucial for addressing
the pivotal question of how to ensure adequate data protec-
tion while promoting important research in the future.
Currently, there is a discussion [61] ongoing in the legal
doctrine about a renewed definition of anonymisation of
data for research purposes, one that is sufficiently nuanced
and comprehensive and that takes into consideration the
specific features of the research context. The proponents
for developing a new definition argue that once personal
identifiers are eliminated from a dataset, researchers often9
have no subjective motivations to re-identify subjects, even
when re-identification remains technically (i.e., objective-
ly) possible (by e.g., combining data from different
datasets). In a similar fashion, also Voekinger et al. [27]
propose a further category of data, namely pseudo-
anonymised, to define all those data where every effort has
been made to anonymise them, but re-identification cannot
be excluded. These legal proposals should also be consid-
ered by the research community so that solutions for find-
ing a definition of anonymisation that is both legally solid
and research friendly. A good starting point for this col-
laboration between the legal and the research worlds is the
creation of courses on data protection for the research com-
munity (see e.g., the initiative of the SPHN [62]). Another
possibility for productive exchange between the research
and legal community is a partnership between researchers
and cantonal data protection officers, who could offer as-
sistance for the interpretation and application of the law if
they are evenly organised and properly funded [63].
Footnotes
1 In European Law, preambles are claims attached to any
approved law to indicate the motivations of the legislator
in enacting such law and to indicate how it ought to be in-
terpreted. They are not, however, legally binding.
2 Manuscripts in preparation.
3 Some cantons, like Zürich (Gesetz über die Information
und den Datenschutz) and Basel-Stadt (Informations- und
Datenschutzgesetz), have regulations that deal with the
principle of transparency for public bodies and “informa-
tion” more generally, but most of the rules are in reference
to personal data. Additionally, there are some other federal
regulations that contain rules concerning non-personal data
(e.g., the LIH).
4 A third element sometimes considered is that of defining
what information means (see e.g,, [21], pp. 25ss), which is
normally interpreted extremely quite broadly as to include
information in any form and on any support (e.g., digital,
analogue).
5 The key can be, for example, a conversion table where
every code-name is associated with the original ID, or
another technical device that can recover the original ID
starting from the codename.
6 See, for example, Baeriswyl and Parli ([22] pp. 35–36)
where it is argued that in such cases data can be considered
anonymized (non-personal) from the perspective of the re-
searchers. The same stance is argued in [28].
7 This holds true also in Switzerland, where the FADP and
each cantonal regulation on data protection considers data
concerning health as worth of additional protection.
8 The right to informational self-determination (informa-
tionelle Selbstbestimmung) is not directly present in the
law in Switzerland, but it has been introduced into case
law and has been recognised by the doctrine (e.g., [54]), al-
though sometimes in a critical fashion [55].
9 But not always: for example, when they could return clin-
ically relevant incidental findings.
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